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Introduction 
The interface between agriculture and environmental policy has received increasing 
attention in recent years.   This attention has been sharpened by ‘food scares’ such as 
BSE, Foot and Mouth Disease, the safety of Genetically-Modified Organisms, 
agriculturally-sourced water pollution as well as the increasing knowledge and 
concern over agriculture’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions.  At the same 
time pressures to liberalise agricultural trade and to remove production subsidies in 
the European Union and the United States have grown.  Caricatures of the ‘barley 
baron’ who collects a large subsidy cheque while African peasants starve have 
become a commonplace in the European press.  Similarly, the 2002 farm bill debate 
was peppered with frequent revelations of which wealthy celebrity was receiving 
millions in farm subsidies.   
 
Countries have responded very differently to these pressures. For example, the United 
States policy has increased its use of conservation programs, which traditionally take 
agricultural production and the environment as substitutes, whereas the EU has 
introduced programs that view them more as complements.
1  Programs based on the 
precept that agriculture has positive externalities have been viewed with scepticism in 
some quarters (specifically in the United States), the concern being that these are just 
a more acceptable way of delivering subsidies to farmers . The EU, by contrast, 
argues that their programs are addressing legitimate externalities.  As the OECD 
notes,  ‘a key policy concern is to distinguish between agri-environmental measures 
that actually address market failures by internalising environmental externalities or 
ensuring the provision of public goods associated with agriculture, from policies that 
appear to be merely labelled ‘green’ and used as a means of disguised protection’ 
(OECD 2003).  In this paper, we ask what are the targets of the EU agri-
environmental policies? We use econometric techniques to test whether the EU agri-
environmental programs are in response to specific externalities or, alternatively, 
whether they are substitutes for more traditional forms of agricultural support.  
 
Even within Europe, there are startling differences among agri-environmental 
programs. We hope that understanding the differences in agri-environmental 
programs within the EU will give us further insight into the differences between the 
Americans and the European approaches.  Our findings are that the very ‘specificity’ 
of European agriculture makes a single unifying theory not necessarily impossible but 
certainly unproven to date.  We find that EU agri-environmental measures (AEMs) do 
not appear to be targeted to negative externalities, nor do they seem to be straight 
substitutes for price subsidies.  There is some evidence, presented below, that the 
‘greener’ the member state, the higher the spending on AEMs, while states with a 
heavier dependence on the agricultural sector tend to spend less.  
 
An important element of multifunctionality is the maintenance of rural livelihoods, 
and so we spend some time reviewing the concept of rural life in European thought.  
American attitudes to agriculture and environment are then investigated using the 
contrasting backdrop of European policies and attitudes as a counterfoil because, as 
noted above, the main thrust of this paper is the study of the underlying motivations of 
                                                 
1 A more detailed discussion on the differences between the American and European approaches is 
available in Baylis, Rausser and Simon (2003)   
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the European agri-environmental programs.  We propose a number of reasons for 
differences in agri-environmental policy, and test for these using data from the EU.  
We then move on to a brief discussion of the enlargement of the EU, with the 




Different views of the agri-environmental nexus 
 
Some commentators have attributed the differences in demand between the 
Americans and the Europeans to a fundamental clash of agri-ecological ideologies, 
and so it is worth spending some time reviewing this purported issue. The Europeans 
are portrayed as viewing the natural environment as having been produced in part by 
generations of farming and ranching, whereas for Americans, “nature” is seen as 
being at its best when undisturbed by any human activity (Burrell, 2001; Hodge, 
2000).  
 
The European view of agriculture 
 
Despite its declining importance in strictly economic terms, for Europeans agriculture 
and rural life retains great emotive power. This attitude was summed up in a speech 
made by the EU Agricultural Commissioner Franz Fischler at the 1996 Cork 
Conference on Rural Europe: ‘The European rural space is a socio-economic model in 
the broadest sense of the word, which must be preserved for the benefit of the whole 
of European society’ (Rural Europe, 1997:2).  Similarly, a 1988 Eurobarometer 
opinion poll showed that the EU is inclined to reserve a particular treatment to 
agriculture, and as long as the cost of support under the CAP is manageable, then the 
public is prepared to see agriculture as not only an economic activity.  This attitude 
has if anything strengthened since then, as a similar 2003 survey indicates (EC 2004). 
 
In Europe, the primary response to the Uruguay Round has been to emphasise the 
linkages between agriculture, the environment, and the development and management 
of rural areas. This approach is encapsulated in the concept of multifunctionality.  The 
EU, supported by its farm organisations, has taken the view that the additional 
benefits of agriculture are not marketable and that these are consequently under-
produced relative to the levels that society might desire. They also argue that these 
non-marketed outputs will suffer if agricultural support prices are reduced by trade 
liberalisation.  
 
There is some empirical support for this position, in that non-farming citizens 
sometimes themselves attempt to provide ‘missing’ additional benefits. A Finnish 
study (Yrjola 2004) found that the WTP of Finnish consumers/citizens for 
multifunctional agriculture was ‘remarkable’. Sweden gives a further interesting 
example of non-farming citizens filling the perceived space between actually-existing 
agriculture and their ideal situation. The Swedish branch of the WWF has bought 
herds of cattle which are rented out to farmers in order to maintain grazing on 
environmentally interesting areas. A significant amount of work is required from 
volunteers, a revealed preference for a certain type of farmed landscape.  
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AEMs began on an ad hoc basis in some member states in the 1980s. They were 
optional until 1992 when they became an ‘accompanying measure’ during the 
Common Agricultural Policy reforms of that year (Agri-environment Regulation 
2078/1992).  They were later embodied in Rural Development Regulation 1257/1999 
as part of the ‘Agenda 2000’ CAP reform. 
 
AEMs function by encouraging farmers to make commitments beyond usual Good 
Farming Practice.  Farmers are not paid for merely conforming to current 
environmental legislation, in application of the Polluter Pays Principle.  More than 
conformity is required.  For example, a widely adopted AEM is support for 
conversion to organic farming, the goal being the reduction of the nitrogen balance.  
The maintenance of pastures, particularly alpine, is similarly encouraged, to prevent 
the abandonment of farming land, the loss of rural communities which would follow, 
and the disappearance of a culturally important landscape feature.  
 
The EU approach, therefore, focuses on reduction of inputs rather than restricting 
harmful outputs.  Thus organic farming is encouraged for example, as a way of 
controlling nitrate leaching. The EU approach is rather flexible, and is therefore in 
conformity with one of the EU’s core principles, that of ‘subsidiarity’: decisions are 
taken at the lowest feasible level. It is up to member states to decide what measures, if 
any, to take, and how much to spend.  In some cases, regions within countries make 
such decisions (Italy, Spain, Germany), and in all cases it is the farmer who makes the 
final decision on whether to take part.   
 
The planners are naturally aware of the pragmatism of farmers, and so the payments 
are pitched at an attractive level. In the words of the EC, ‘providing agri-
environmental services can serve as an interesting income opportunity for farmers 
engaged in this field’ (EC2005).  The flexibility and site-specificity alluded to above 
makes AEMs, at least in the view of the EU, ‘a highly refined tool for environmental 
integration’ (EC 2005). The voluntary nature of the measures means that uptake of 
AEM funding is very variable within the EU (see table 1).  As an example of the 
variations, in Sweden, Austria and Italy, expenditure for AEMs is much higher than 
the EU average
2, while Belgium, Spain, the Netherlands and Greece hardly reach 
30%. As noted above, discovering why this variation exists is one of the aims of this 
research.  
 
American Response to European AEMs 
 
Not surprisingly, the EU approach of paying farmers for non-marketed outputs has 
not been well-received  by the United States.  The suggestion has been made that 
multifunctionality is merely a thinly-veiled means of keeping farmers in business, 
repackaging protectionism pre-Uruguay Round style. An editorial in Agra Europe 
commented: “[the EU] has gone to enormous lengths to create, both domestically and 
internationally, the camouflage of ‘multifunctionality’ to justify the continuation and 
probable increase of expenditure of more than 40 billion a year on bolstering an 
industry which is quite capable of surviving without subsidies” (Agra Europe 
editorial, 9/28/2001). It should be noted that an OECD report (OECD 2003) 
                                                 
2 The EU average is 50% of EAGGF Guarantee expenses. Cofinancing by member states is 15% in 
Objective 1 areas and 40% in others.   
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considered that ‘environmental payments are a statistically significant determinant of 
agricultural production and trade’. 
 
European Cultural Nostalgia 
 
Behind attempts to legitimise AEMs there is the constant presence of cultural 
nostalgia.
3  The almost folkloric figure of the farmer, especially the smaller, less 
technologically advanced one, remains in the popular imagination a representative of 
the good old days when European countries were basically rural societies.   
 
For Europeans the rural life continues to have a symbolic value for those citizens who 
feel uncomfortable with the modernisation of society, globalisation and urbanisation. 
It is a place of refuge, the pastoral life a rural idyll. Against this  background, the 
strongly expressed reluctance to cultivate GMOs and other products of a highly 
technical world  is more understandable.
4  Linked with this have been AEMs to 
preserve traditional technologies, endangered breeds of farm animals, and generally 
discourage intensive farming. 
 
Related to this is the possibility that in wealthier members of the EU the environment 
is becoming a luxury good.
5  Bimonte has modeled a 1996 sample of 36 European 
countries and their share of land devoted to protected areas, such as parks, and found 
that this hypothesis could not be rejected (Bimonte 2002).  Clearly Bimonte’s study 
took in a much wider range of countries than the EU15 with which we are currently 
interested, but if anything this strengthens the argument: the EU15 would be the 
wealthiest countries in out of the 36.   
 
Much of the lifestyle associated in the mind of the urban European with farming has 
long gone, if indeed it ever existed. However the myth remains strongly etched, and 
multifunctionality can be seen as an attempt to salvage  some last features of the old 
rural life before they disappear forever. The place of the farmer as a seasoned 
custodian of the land is one such feature. Interestingly, for people who so enjoy 
looking back, the desire to retrieve ‘traditional’ farming and landscape on behalf of 
absent future generations is often noted (Barthelemy 2004).  
 
Wilderness and the American approach 
 
The European policies reflect the view that continuance of farming can benefit the 
environment when undertaken in a responsible manner.  For example, AEMs 
especially in Less Favoured Areas (LFAs) aim at keeping land productive, although 
mowing late in the season instead of grazing might be required. Abandonment of 
farmland is seen as harmful to the environment, often because birds and other 
creatures which have developed with the farming ecosystem would then lose habitat.  
                                                 
3 The well known British conservative philosopher Roger Scruton’s recent book England: An Elegy 
laments lost cultural values; the TV channel ‘Gold’ has a continuous diet of heart-warming tales of the 
times when everyone knew their place.  
4 A study published by Environics International (2000) into perceived risks of biotechnology found that 
in the United States 66% of people interviewed thought that the benefits of biotechnology outweigh the 
risks. The corresponding figure for France and Greece is 22%. 
5Little work has been done in Europe on monetary value and landscapes. Of the fifteen studies which 
have been done, nine were in the United Kingdom and six in Italy (Tiziano 2004). 
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In contrast the U.S. view is that there is a conflict between expanding (or maintaining) 
agricultural production and the environment. U.S. policy focuses primarily on the 
negative environmental externalities while EU policy is concerned with potential 
positive externalities generated by agricultural production.  
 
For example, farmers in the United States are often specifically paid to abandon 
farmland through the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  Furthermore, farmers 
are paid a premium through the CRP if they seed traditional cover crops or plant 
native trees, in an attempt to return the land to its pre-farmed state. The underlying 
assumption is that land  attains a higher environmental value when it is taken out of 
farming and returned to its natural state; stewards are not needed for the land, or 
farmers do not act as the best stewards. 
 
‘Landscape’ and ‘organic’  payments further illustrate this difference: in 2001 the 
majority of EU agri-environment payments were targeted at landscape
6 and wildlife 
management (Buller 2001). In the United States, there are no payments for landscape. 
Payments for wildlife habitat fall under the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program 
(WHIP) which receives only about one half of one per cent of total U.S. agri-
environment funding. A large portion of agri-environment payments support organic 
farming in the EU, while organic farming is not subsidised at all in the United States.  
 
To summarise the U.S. philosophy: land is at its best when it is wilderness and 
untouched by human hand; the land areas which are farmed should be subjected to 
output restrictions on negative externalities, while the inputs and methods used are 




Possible reasons for differences between  EU and U.S. approaches 
 
Above we have described a number of fundamental differences between the EU and 
U.S. policies. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether there is any one underlying 
root cause for such differences.  Finding the root cause goes beyond interesting 
philosophical speculation about worldviews; knowing the root cause would certainly 
be helpful in assessing the success of trade negotations for example. We split these 
differences into demand, supply and political causes. 
 
Following Baylis, Rausser and Simon (2003), the position we take in this paper is that 
the difference can be attributed to purely economic considerations if a) the marginal 
dollar currently being spent on reducing negative externalities in the United States 
generates a larger net social benefit than would be generated if this dollar were 
redirected towards promoting positive externalities and b) the reverse inequality holds 
for the EU.  
 
From our description above of the different attitudes held by European and American 
citizens to agriculture, it is  reasonable to suppose that utility mappings in the EU and 
                                                 
6 As a typical example, in Voralberg, Austria, an extra area-based ‘landscape’ payment for farms of 
less than 2 ha was made available in 1999 (OECD, 2000).   
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U.S. specifications will be quite different. This is because utility mapping depends 
crucially on factors that are difficult to measure, such as the non-pecuniary benefits 
that farmers receive from farming; the relative weights that environmental lobbies 
assign to the range of environmental priorities and the use-value that consumers 
derive from environmental amenities. 
 
Variations in consumer preferences could conceivably lead to an affirmative answer 
to one or both of the above.  Since Europeans in many EU member states live only a 
few hours away from farmland, it seems plausible that the appearance of the rural 
landscape is more important to Europeans than Americans, who are located much 
further away from the agricultural heartland.  However if this were indeed the case we 
would expect in Europe to see those farmers located in countries with greater 
domestic tourism receiving higher level of compensation for producing environmental 
goods.  In the United States we note that there are certainly areas which benefit from 
agri-tourism, such as farms in Vermont, but there are no U.S. programs to preserve 
such landscapes.
7   
 
Supply of externalities can also affect the optimal policy.  As mentioned above, due to 
production technology and environmental characteristics, agricultural production can 
produce different externalities in different regions.  Conceivably, production in the 
United States may produce more negative externalities while that in the EU may 
produce less.  If this is the case, the distribution of agri-environmental programs 
within the EU should also reflect this pattern: that those countries with the largest 
externalities should spend the most on agri-environmental measures. 
 
There are also political factors that may affect policy outcomes.  The more obvious of 
these is lobbying.  Perhaps agri-environmental programs are just a result of presure 
from EU producers to tranfer more income to them in a way that would not attract 
unwanted public (or trade) attention, that would potentially erode those benefits in the 
future. 
 
Structural factors that may also affect policy outcomes.  For example, the EU member 
states jointly finance agri-environmental programs while in the United States the 
national programs, with minor exceptions, are federally funded. In terms of the issue 
space in the EU, there is an implicit joint restriction on the set of negotiable policies 
because individual states insist on their right to tailor programs to meet their own 
needs. In the United States individual stakeholder groups and geographic regions do 
not feel obliged to challenge programs that do not result in direct benefits to them. 
They do not pay for the programs and so have little motive or justification for 
intervention.  
 
The issue space, i.e. the set over which parties can bargain, can also affect policy 
outcomes. An example of the restrictive issue space is the simmering disagreement 
between the UK and the other EU members, especially France, over the ‘special’ 
rebate the Britsh receive. The rebate from the EU was negotiated by Mrs Thatcher in 
1984 as part of continued British membership. Now that the UK has overtaken other 
EU members in terms of wealth, it does seem unusual that the rebate should continue, 
                                                 
7 The one possible exception is the U.S. Farmland Protection Program (FPP). While the FPP preserves 
farm land from development, it does not target “landscape”.   
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especially as there are now much poorer members of the club. It appears that the 
British may use annulment of the rebate as a requirement for further CAP reform, that 
is reduced protection for European agricultural markets. In the words of the British 
Treasury
8, ‘Any negotiation of the British rebate would have to be conditional on very 
radical alterations to the current CAP’. 
 
There are also differences in “access” that may be determined by political structure.  
For example, a first-past-the-post system may make it difficult for non-traditional 
parties and groups to find representation at the elected level.   However, a system of 
proportional representation with a sufficiently low cut-off, may allow a wider range of 
views to be heard.  Proportional Representative (PR) systems may therefore be more 
flexible in responding to changes in public demand, and more representative of 
minority views, as long as those minorities are nationally distributed.  However, PR 
systems may be less representative of specific regional concerns 
 
A further related view is that differences in agri-environmental programs are a result 
of the EU is adjusting to internal pressures of its own, notably enlargement and the 
strain on the budget that the new members
9, who tend to be less wealthy, bring with 
them. At the time of writing (May 2005) the EU had failed to agree on a budget for 
the period beyond 2007.  The EU had wanted spending to rise to 1.14% of GDP to 
finance the new members, but the wealthier countries, such as Germany, France, 
Austria, the Netherlands and the UK have rejected this and prefer to retain the current 
1% limit.  
 
Extension of production-linked payments under CAP to all new members would have 
been extremely expensive, especially as the new members depend more heavily on 
agriculture as a share of GDP and employment.  Poland for example has nearly 20% 
of its workforce in agriculture.  Decoupling of subsidies from production and  
encouraging the ‘old’ EU members to cease farming at maximum output and  instead 
consume the products of the new members would make economic sense. This would 
be politically popular at home,  and would also appease critics in less developed 
nations demanding an end to the dumping and closed markets which tend to go along 
with a cossetted domestic farming community.   
 
In the following section, we explicitly test several hypotheses about EU agri-
environmental expenditure: 
(1) Is it driven by the supply of negative externalities, 
(2) Is it driven by the demand for positive externalities,  
(3) is it purely a means to transfer income to producers? and  
(4) is it affected by political institutional structure. 
 
We also ask whether the result of the 2002 reforms were fundamentally different in 




                                                 
8 Reported in The Daily Telegraph, 15 May 2005.  
9 In May 2004 these countries joined the EU: Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Cyprus and Malta. Romania and Bulgaria will join in 2007. Talks with 
Turkey may start by the end of 2005.    
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Econometric analysis of the uptake of AEMs within the EU 
 
Our analysis used econometric techniques to regress funds for AEMs from 1992 to 
2002 against a range of potential supply and demand variables. We have also included 
political variables, such as voting structure and methods within member states of fund 
allocation. Belgium and Luxembourg’s statistics have been amalgamated. We were 
not able in all cases to obtain data for every year for every member state, and so have 
had to make appropriate adjustments.  Because of data constraints, two countries are 
effectively removed from the sample (Spain and Ireland).  However, when the 
variables with the missing data are removed, results remain virually unchanged.  The 
sources of the data are the EU (Eurostat), the FAO, and the OECD.  
 
For supply, we consider a number of factors that represent technology and the 
production of externalities.  Specifically, we include the amount of chemical inputs 
(nitrogen fertilizer and pesticides) used per hectare and irrigation per hectare of 
farmed land to represent farming intensity.  We also inclue farm size to represent 
technology.  If the agri-environmental programs are intended to reduce intensive 
farming practices, they will presumably be targeted at those regions with the highest 
degree of intensive agriculture. 
 
To represent demand for positive externalities produced by agriculture, we use the 
amount of domestic tourism.  We also a couple of variables, specifically the percent 
of Members of the European Parliament representing the Green Party and the amount 
of environmetal expenditure per GDP to capture the “greeness” of the member state.   
Last, we include GDP per capita and GDP per capita squared to capture the effect of 
income on the demand for environmental goods. 
 
A number of variables capture the lobby of the farm sector.  The lagged agricultural 
expenditure is included.  If the agri-environmental expenditure is simply a means of 
delivering agricultural subsidies, those regions with the highest agricultural 
expenditure will take most advantage of the agri-environmental payments.  Following 
Osterburg (2004) we also include whether the member state was using cross-
compliance rules, thus demanding that farmers meet certain minimum practices 
before receiving other agricultural funding.  If the country uses cross-compliance, 
producers may demand more agri-environmental funding as compensation, or, at a 
minimum, may be less resistant to transferring price support to environmental 
payments, since in either case they have to undertake some level of environmentally-
friendly production practices. 
 
We also include the percent of the population living in the rural area and the percent 
of GDP provided by agriculture, to capture the strength of the agricultural industry, 
both in terms of potential vote and in terms of economic strength. 
 
Last, we include a number of political variables, such as the percent of seats elected 
using proportional representation, and the participation in European and domestic 
elections.  These are intended to capture “voice,” both in terms of whether the 
populace (particularly minorities) feel they have access, and the degree of public 
apathy, both to the EU and in general. 
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The percent of agricultural expenditure going to agri-environmental measures was 
estimated uses a panel regression with random effects.  Different dummies  
representing country grouping were included, but were not found to be significant.  





Overall, Agri-environmental expenditure seemed to be correlated to demand, but 
negatively correlated to supply (see regression results in table 3).   Countries with 
more intensive farming practices, whether that was represented by the amount of 
farmland irrigated or chemical itensity, spent less on agri-environmental measures 
than their more extesive counterparts.
10  Thus, the countries that conceivably have the 
largest roduction of negative externalities that are investing the least amount of money 
in changing their production.  Conceivably, this is due to the fact that countries with 
established intensive production techology are loathe to give up their comparative 
advantage (and price supports), while farmers that are already extensive, do not mind 
being funded to become more so.   More predictably, those countries with smaller 
farms had higher a higher portion of their agricultural expenditure go to agri-
environmental programs.  Farmers with smaller holdings may not receive the same 
amount of traditional subsidies as their larger couterparts, and therefore may be more 
willing to use agri-environmental expenditure that may be more accessible to them.  
For example some of the agri-environmental programs subsidised the use of 
traditional farming  practices, that presumably require a smaller farmed acreage. 
 
If a country used cross-compliance, that country was more likely to spend a greater 
percent of their agricultural budget on agri-environmental measures.  As noted above, 
this may be because producers already have to adopt environmentally-friendly 
production practives to receive agricultural support, and are therefore less likely to 
raise concerns about making some of these paymets explicit.   
 
In terms of demand, there is reasoably strong evidence that countries with a greater 
demand for environmental goods spend more of their agricultural budget on the 
environment.   The greater portion of Members of the European Parliament 
representing the Green party, the greater the portion of agri-enviromental expenditure.  
A larger environment budget also led to a greater portion of the agricultural budget 
going to agri-environmetal measures.  This result is perhaps unsurprising, however it 
does indicate that agri-environmental funds were not being used as a substitute for 
other environmental expenditure.  A greater amount of domestic tourism also 
increased the agri-environmental expenditure, perhaps indicating that there are some 
perceived positive externalities produced by agriculture that are demanded by a 
populace that likes travelling the countryside. 
 
Agri-environmental goods do seem to have a positive income elasticity.  The greater 
the GDP per capita, the greater the supply of agri-environmental funding, relative to 
other forms of agricultural support.   
 
                                                 
10 The percent of farmland irrigated was only significant at the 16 percent level; however its sign 
remained unchanged regardless of the exact specifications.   
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The financial contribution of the agricultural sector increased the agri-environmental 
expenditure, while a larger proportion of population in the rural area decreased it.  
This apprently contradictory result can perhaps be explained by noting that a large 
agricultural value-added often results from a larger processing sector and the 
production of high value crops.  These crops are not those that tend to receive the bulk 
of government financial support, and in some cases that support may even make 
inputs more expensive for processors.  Therefore some components of the agricultural 
industry may not have been upset to see some funds go to agri-environmental 
programs as opposed to price supports.   
 
The fact that the larger the rural population, the smaller the portion of agri-
environmental payments may indicate that people in the rural area would be pleased 
to have the CAP remain as is.  Specifically, they may feel that their interests are best 
served by continued agricultural subsidies that do not rely on changes in production 
technology. 
 
Past agricultural expenditure does not seem to affect the degree of funding going  to 
agri-environmental measures.  Although the coefficient is positive, it is far from 
significant, and when the change in agricultural expenditure was included, the two 
variables decreased in sigificance even further.  The implication is that agri-
environmental payments are not explicitly being used as a substitute for agricultural 
subsidies, and that regardless of their level of agricultural subsidisation, countries 
have a relatively similar portion of their budget going to agri-environmental measures, 
all else equal. 
 
Political strucure does affect the degree of agri-environmental expenditure.  Countries 
with proportional representation had a larger agri-evironmetal expenditure.  Since PR 
in some countries has allowed new parties such as the Greens to gain standing in the 
legislature, this may be undestandable.  The implication would seem to be that a 
system that allows a broader representation facilitates environmental expenditure.  
Interestingly, the lower the interest in the EU as represented in the turnout in EU 
elections relative to domestic elections, the higher the agri-environmental 
expenditure.   This results may be due to the fact that other agricultural expenditure is 
determined at the EU level, while, since agri-environmental measures are co-financed 
by the European Commission and the member state, agri-environmental programs are 
determined, at least in part, at the country level.  Thus, if a country had a strong 
interest in traditional agricultural support, they would have to make their voice heard 
through the European Parliament, while the member state has more control over agri-
environmental expenditure.   That said, the greater the overall apathy (as represented 
by turnout in domestic elections), the greater agri-environmental expenditure.  This 
result may represents the fact that younger, urban voters tend to have a lower turnout, 
but have a higher demand for evironmental expenditure. 
   
The same regression was performed for overall agricultural expenditure and the 
differences were notable (see table 4).  The relative participation in EU elections now 
strongly positively affected the amount of total agricultural expenditure, while 
proportional representation had a strong negative effect.  Also interesting is that cross-
compliance rules tended to lead to lower  agricultural expediture. Further, lagged 
agricultural chemical concentration increases agricultural expenditure, implying that 
overall agricultural expediture goes to those member states that use more intensive   
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farming methods.  This latter finding is mitigated by the effect of irrigation, which 
shows that countries with large amounts of irrigated land receive 
lessagriculturalsubsidies.  This result may be due to the fact that irrigated land tends 
to produce higher value crops (such as horticultural produce) which are not as highly 
subsidised. 
 
Not surprisingly, the degree of rural population and the lagged influence of 
agriculture on the economy both now have a positive effect.   
  
The regression on the percent of agri-environmental paymets was run for all years and 
then separately for the 1992-1998 period, to separate out the effects of the 2002 
reform.  The 2002 reform was explicitly designed to address the concerns with EU 
enlargement, and we attempted to determine whether this goal changed the factors 
affecting agri-environmental expenditure.  The only notable change in the results was 
that the lagged agricultural expenditure was significant (and positive) for the earlier 
reform years, whereas it was not for the entire time period (see table 5).  Although this 
is a weak result, it may indicate that the earlier reform was more concerned with 
converting price supports to forms of existing agri-environmental expenditure, while 
in the recent reforms, the concern was more with converting potential agricultural 
subsidies in the incoming states into more production-neutral programs.  Thus, for 
members of the EU-15, switching funds out of price supports into agri-environmental 
payments mattered less than ensuring Poland do so. 
 
 
Summary and conclusions 
 
The EU agri-environmental programs tend to be going to member states that already 
do what the programs encourage .i.e. those that have to change their current 
technology and production patterns the least.  Perhaps this is not surprising, however 
it does indicate that the largest potential gains are being foregone.  Specifically, note 
that those countries with the highest agricultural chemical intensity are spending the 
least on agri-environmental measures.  When one notes that Austria and Sweden, two 
countries with non-intensive agricultural production, have two of the larges agri-
environmental program, the result is perhaps not surprising, but it does indicate that 
the funds are not going to reduce intesification where the intensification is the highest.  
That said, the results to not suppor the cynical view that agri-environmental 
characteristics are solely a means of transferring income to producers in a more 
acceptable fashion.  The portion of the agricultural budget going to agri-
environmental expenditure was not a function of past agricultural support, nor did a 
reduction in agricultural spending lead to an increase in agri-environmental funds. 
 
However agri-environmental schemes seem to be demanded by the public.  Those 
member states with a greater interest in the environment and domestic tourism have 
larger agri-environmental programs. Likewise, the fact that a larger rural population 
leads to a smaller portion of agri-environmental expenditure may indicate that these 
are adopted by a somewhat grudging agricultural sector, imposed by urban, green 
demand.  Also notable is the fact that the richer countries spent more on agri-
environmetal payments.  This result is echoed in the United States where the Senators 
who supported the farm bill amendments to convert funding from price supports to 
conservation measures were also predominantly from non-farm, weathier states with a   
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history of evironmental conciousness (for example, from the northeastern and the 
western United States.)  
  
We see a similar pattern of environmental programs to compensate for cross-
compliance rules in the United States.  For example, when the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) was introduced in 1980, it coincided with the introduction of ‘sod-
buster,’ a cross-compliance rule requiring that producers not farm highly-erodible soil 
if they are to receive government price supports.  Notably the primary target of the 
CRP was to fund farmers to take highly-erodible soil out of production. 
 
Political variables affected the use of agri-environmetal measures.  The greater the 
national level of representation and the greater the access, the greater the portion of 
agri-environmetal expenditure.  However, the greater the interest in the EU, as 
represented by relative electoral turnout, the lower the agri-environmental payments.  
Perhaps those countries with the largest interest in retaining traditional farm supports 
have a higher turnout.  Last, overall voter apathy also leads to higher agri-
environmental measures.  Again, comparing this result to the United States, traditional 
farm states have the highest voter turnout, while the more urban states tend to have 
greater political apathy.  However those same urban states tend to show greater 
support for environmental measures. 
 
In conclusion, it appears that agri-environmental programs may have not been 
uniquely demanded by the farm community, and rather by the urban populace. 
Anecdotal eveidence illustrates that this result also holds in the United States.  
However, the programs do not appear to be targeted where the greatest changes may 
be needed.  Thus, farmers who are strongly tied to their itensive production methods 
appear to be able to push back (or at least not adopt) these kinds of programs.  Instead 
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Table 1: Average agriculture and agri-evironment expenditure by country, 1992-
1998 (million euro) 
 
 Agri-environment  Tot  Ag. 
Agri-environment 
as % of tot 
Belgium + 
Luxembourg 4.02 306.67  1.59 
Denmark 4.70  238.22  1.99 
Germany 193.82  2420.78 9.17 
Greece 2.82  228.33  1.31 
Spain 31.07  846.67  4.33 
France 109.38  3349.22  3.27 
Ireland 45.62  207.11  55.30 
Italy 140.63  1256.89  8.92 
Netherlands 6.75  882.56 0.80 
Austria 182.67  1051.43  24.35 
Portugal 37.83  250.00  17.48 
Finland 88.63  1569.29  8.68 
Sweden 38.28  327.43  18.69 
UK 24.95  1144.22  2.11   
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of Obs  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
      
Agri-environmental programs as % of total agricultural 
expenditure  92 0.39 0.84 
Agricultural value-added as a % of GDP (t-1)  140 2.57 1.92 
Farm size (t-1)  127 17.06 12.49 
Rural population as % of total  154 22.75 12.69 
Percent of farm land that is irrigated (t-1)  140 0.20 0.20 
Farm chemical consumption per ha (t-1)  154 38.75 26.79 
Agricultural expenditure (t-1)  145 1.02 0.99 
percent of MEPs that are Green party members  140 5.59 5.15 
Environmental expenditure as a % of GDP  106 0.48 0.24 
Domestic tourism per capita  96 4.47 2.84 
Cross compliance programs (1 if in place)  154 0.64 0.48 
Participation in EU elections relative to domestic elections  148 73.28 17.98 
Participation in domestic general elections  154 76.84  9.36 
Percent of seats elected using proportional representation  168 0.65 0.44 
GDP per capita  154 20.72  6.53   
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Table 3: Regression on Agri-environmental programs as percent of total 
agricultural expenditure 
 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Err.  P-stat 
      
Agricultural value-added as a % of GDP (t-1)  0.326  0.126  0.01
Farm size (t-1)  -0.120  0.020  0
Rural population as % of total  -0.077  0.018  0
Percent of farm land that is irrigated (t-1)  -2.147  1.517  0.157
Farm chemical consumption per ha (t-1)  -0.023  0.005  0
Agricultural expenditure (t-1)  0.080  0.171  0.64
percent of MEPs that are Green party members  0.076  0.027  0.006
Environmental expenditure as a % of GDP  4.404  0.839  0
Domestic tourism per capita  0.044  0.037  0.228
Cross  compliance  programs  0.398 0.243 0.101
Participation in EU elections relative to domestic elections  -0.040  0.006  0
Participation in domestic general elections  -0.088  0.025  0
Percent of seats elected using proportional representation  1.364  0.473  0.004
GDP  per  capita  0.248 0.123 0.043
GDP per capita
2  -0.003 0.004 0.366
year  0.104 0.076 0.171
dummy for 2002  -0.035  0.494  0.944
Constant  6.511 2.724 0.017
R
2 0.940    
Number of observations  40    
Number of countries included  12    
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Table 4: Regression on total agricultural expenditure 
 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Err.  P-stat
   
Agricultural value-added as a % of GDP (t-1)  178.305 58.923 0.002
Farm size (t-1)  5.941 7.169 0.407
Rural population as % of total  53.026 7.344 0
Percent of farm land that is irrigated (t-1)  -2878.614 656.340 0
Farm chemical consumption per ha (t-1)  11.594 3.708 0.002
percent of MEPs that are Green party members  44.990 10.045 0
Domestic tourism per capita  73.881 25.148 0.003
Cross compliance programs  -410.350 136.111 0.003
Participation in EU elections relative to domestic 
elections  16.757 3.259 0
Participation in domestic general elections  -20.913 8.877 0.018
Percent of seats elected using proportional representation  -1617.266 212.717 0
GDP per capita  218.045 72.544 0.003
GDP per capita^2  -4.379 1.697 0.01
year  0.914 33.004 0.978
dummy for 2002  619.038 140.742 0
Constant  -1932.130 1048.968 0.065
R
2  0.91  
Observations  75  
Number of countries included  12    
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Table 5: Comparison of results for 1992 reforms alone and 1992 and 2002 
reforms combined 
 
  Before 2002  For entire period 
        





        
Agricultural value-added as a % of GDP (t-1)  0.030 0.030 0.326  0.126
Farm size (t-1)  -0.005 0.006 -0.120  0.020
Rural population as % of total  0.004 0.005 -0.077  0.018
Percent of farm land that is irrigated (t-1)  -0.350 0.368 -2.147  1.517
Farm chemical consumption per ha (t-1)  -0.002 0.001 -0.023  0.005
Agricultural expenditure (t-1)  0.063 0.033 0.080 0.171
percent of MEPs that are Green party members  0.004 0.007 0.076  0.027
Environmental Expediture as a % of GDP  0.273 0.262 4.404  0.839
Domestic tourism per capita  -0.007 0.007 0.044  0.037
Cross compliance programs  -0.079 0.059 0.398  0.243
Participation in EU elections relative to domestic 
elections  -0.005 0.002 -0.040  0.006
Participation in domestic general elections  0.008 0.006 -0.088  0.025
Percent of seats elected using proportional 
representation 0.049 0.107 1.364  0.473
GDP per capita  0.044 0.042 0.248  0.123
GDP per capita^2  -0.001 0.001 -0.003  0.004
year  0.035 0.015 0.104 0.076
dummy for 2002      -0.035  0.494
constant -0.757 0.740 6.511  2.724
Bold implies significant at  the 5 percent level.  Bold italics indicate significant at the 10 percent level 
 